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BAD SAMARITANS MAKE DANGEROUS
PRECEDENT: THE PERILS OF HOLDING AN
EMPLOYER LIABLE FOR AN EMPLOYEE'S
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION
When Jane Doe went to Samaritan Counseling Center seeking
psychological counseling, she set in motion the events which
culminated in Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center.' Doe claimed that
her therapist, Dr. Garvin, fondled her during two counseling sessions,
and then convinced her to cancel all further sessions and continue
their sexual relationship outside the office.2 Within a month this rela-
tionship culminated in sexual intercourse. Doe subsequently sued Dr.
Garvin and Samaritan Counseling Center for the psychological harm
she suffered as a result of their sexual intimacy. After the superior
court rejected her respondeat superior claim against the counseling
center, Doe appealed the summary judgment ruling to the Alaska
Supreme Court.3
In reversing this ruling, the supreme court significantly expanded
the boundaries of an employer's vicarious liability under Alaska com-
mon law. The perils of too readily expanding tort liability are espe-
cially evident for this tort doctrine, which holds one party liable for
the torts committed by another party. As applied to Samaritan, this
liability would be in addition to both Dr. Garvin's personal liability
and the Center's potential liability for negligence in hiring and super-
vising Garvin. Restricting vicarious liability in this situation would
have had no effect on Doe's recovery for actual negligence from the
counseling center.
In the commercial setting, vicarious liability can be justified as a
required cost of doing business. Vicarious liability in a non-commer-
cial4 setting, however, can threaten the very existence of enterprises
Copyright © 1991 Alaska Law Review
1. 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
2. Id. at 345.
3. Id.
4. The distinction between "commercial" and "non-commercial" is an amor-
phous one. For the purposes of this Note, the distinction is based primarily on the
social utility of the enterprise involved. In general, the marketplace appropriately de-
termines the survival of profit-based business enterprises. Certain industries, however,
are valued regardless of their ability to make a profit - day care centers, hospitals,
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such as mental health clinics, schools and volunteer service organiza-
tions, because they have little or no ability to absorb the costs of such
liability by passing increased costs on to consumers. Samaritan's ex-
pansion of vicarious liability has the potential to jeopardize such non-
commercial enterprises. This Note argues that neither case precedent
nor the rationale underlying liability for enterprises can support the
expansion of vicarious liability in this manner. In fact, the Samaritan
decision itself illustrates the inherent limitations of the enterprise lia-
bility theory.
Section II provides an overview of the terms and rationales asso-
ciated with an employer's vicarious liability. Section III examines
how the Samaritan court analyzed prior case law and the Restatement
(Second) of Agency in determining the scope of an employer's vicari-
ous liability. Section IV addresses the Samaritan majority's failure to
consider that the purposes of the enterprise liability theory cannot be
achieved without recognizing the dichotomy between commercial and
non-commercial enterprises. Section V focuses on recent decisions
that demonstrate the limits of the enterprise liability theory in non-
commercial settings. Section VI concludes that Samaritan should be
narrowly construed and suggests that the legislature may be in the best
position to determine the precise boundaries of an employer's vicari-
ous liability.
II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND THE ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY THEORY
Vicarious liability has several guises. Under the law of agency,
principals can be held vicariously liable for the torts of their agents.5
Similarly, the common law doctrine of respondeat superior holds mas-
ters liable for torts committed by servants. 6 An employer's vicarious
liability was traditionally based on a "control" theory, which extended
the scope of liability only to those actions under the employer's con-
trol. The enterprise liability theory has now become widely accepted
as the modem justification for an employer's vicarious liability, based
Boy Scout organizations - and their demise would entail more than reducing con-
sumer choice. Imposing economic hardship on these enterprises would curtail public
access to necessities like affordable medical care, child care and volunteer services.
This dichotomy between non-commercial and commercial enterprises will be signifi-
cant in evaluating the need to impose liability on employers for their employees' sex-
ual misconduct.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
6. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-70 (5th ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988). Prosser and Keeton and others often use the antiquated terms
"master" and "servant." See, e.g., id.
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on the premise that losses incurred as a result of an enterprise's opera-
tion should be borne by the enterprise as a required cost of doing busi-
ness.7 According to this rationale, the employer who profits from the
enterprise is in the best position to absorb and distribute losses by us-
ing price increases or liability insurance.8
Although the enterprise liability theory has tended to expand the
scope of vicarious liability, this expansion has never resulted in strict
employer liability for all employee torts. An important limitation on
an employer's vicarious liability is that the employee's tort must be
sufficiently associated with the enterprise to justify the imposition of
liability. In other words, an employer is vicariously liable only for the
conduct of employees that occurs within the scope of their employ-
ment.9 As stated in section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, the employee conduct must be "actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master."' 1 This standard, which excludes vicari-
ous liability for an employee's personally motivated torts," is gener-
ally recognized as the "motivation to serve" test. 12
The Alaska Supreme Court has, since 1973, acknowledged that
section 228 of the Restatement is "relevant" in determining whether
an employee's misconduct is within the scope of employment.' 3 Sa-
maritan, however, significantly expanded the Restatement's "scope of
employment" requirement by transforming the "motivation to serve"
test into a much broader "reasonably incident" test. In order to pre-
serve Doe's vicarious liability claim, the court concluded that the
scope of Dr. Garvin's employment may have encompassed his sexual
7. Id. § 69 at 500-01. Enterprise liability is "a rule of policy, a deliberate alloca-
tion of risk." Id. at 500.
8. Id. at 500-01.
9. Id. § 70 at 501. According to section 70, "scope of employment"
refers to those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is
employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may
be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out
the objectives of the employment .... [I]n general the servant's conduct is
within the scope of employment if it is of the kind which he is employed to
perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space,
and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.
Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
10. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(l)(c) (1958).
11. If the employee "acts from purely personal motives ... in no way connected
with the employer's interests, he is considered in the ordinary case to have departed
from his employment, and the master is not liable." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
6, § 70 at 506 & n.48.
12. Id. § 69.
13. Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761, 764 n.14 (Alaska 1973).
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misconduct'. If this decision is construed to permit liability for inten-
tional employee misconduct,' 4 vicarious liability in the employment
setting will be extended beyond its inherent limitations. Such a result
is inconsistent with Alaska precedent and the policies underlying en-
terprise liability.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE RESTATEMENT AND
CASE LAW IN SAMARITAN
When determining Samaritan's liability for Dr. Garvin's sexual
misconduct, the Alaska Supreme Court clearly articulated its reasons
for expanding the standard used to measure the scope of employment.
The "motivation to serve" standard that had been sanctioned by the
Restatement and employed in the court's earlier decisions was rejected
in favor of a new liability standard which transformed the "motivation
to serve" standard beyond recognition. Under this new standard, a
tort is committed within the scope of employment when "tortious con-
duct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's legiti-
mate work activities."' 15 The court chose not to adhere strictly to the
Restatement's approach because strictly following the Restatement
would result in a determination that "an employee's tortious sexual
behavior [was] impelled by motivations other than a desire to further
the interests of the employer." 16 This determination would sanction a
"motivation to serve" test that, from the court's perspective, "too sig-
nificantly undercut[s] the enterprise liability basis of the respondeat su-
perior doctrine."' 7
The enterprise liability theory for an employer's vicarious liability
is well established in the leading Alaska cases, all of which incorpo-
rated the "motivation to serve" standard. The Samaritan court
quoted extensively from Fruit v. Schreiner,I8 the first case adopting the
enterprise liability theory in Alaska, to emphasize that
[t]he basis of respondeat superior has been correctly stated as 'the
desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third
persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute
the burden among those benefited by the enterprise.'
14. See Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 350 (Moore, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
therapist's actions as "intentional misconduct" that breaches the psychotherapeutic
community's ethical standards); id. at 350 n. 1 ("[I]t is generally agreed that therapist-
patient sex is psychologically deleterious for the involved woman patient and is uneth-
ical for the male practitioner .... ) (citing Davidson, Psychiatry's Problem with No
Name: Therapist-Patient Sex, 37 AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 43, 48-49 (1977)).
15. Id. at 348.
16. Id. (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 349.
18. 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
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... Employees' acts sufficiently connected with the enterprise
are in effect considered as deeds of the enterprise itself.19
Two crucial assumptions of the Samaritan decision regarding the
enterprise liability theory are suspect. First, the Samaritan court un-
derestimated the vital role of the "motivation to serve" test in Fruit
and subsequent respondeat superior cases. The court's transformation
of the "motivation to serve" test in Samaritan thus represents a signifi-
cant departure from previous cases that followed the Restatement
guidelines. Second, the court too readily assumed that enterprise lia-
bility policy would be strengthened by the court's drastic modification
of the "motivation to serve" formulation. In fact, this modification
undermines the policy objectives of enterprise liability.
Three supreme court cases prior to Samaritan - Fruit, Luth v.
Rogers and Babler Construction Co.20 and Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co.21 - all indicate that the "motivation to serve" test, along
with other "scope of employment" factors listed in section 228, was an
integral element of the court's analysis in these decisions. In each
case, the court considered the "scope of employment" factors set forth
in section 228 as follows:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but
only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and
space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against an-
other, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if
it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the author-
ized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve
the master.22
Significantly, the Samaritan court emphasized the centrality of the Re-
statement's factors by quoting section 228 in its entirety in the body of
the opinion23 rather than relegating the Restatement to footnotes, as
had been done in the previous respondeat superior cases.2 4 The court
19. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 349 (quoting Fruit, 502 P.2d at 141 (quoting Smith,
Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 716, 718 (1923))).
20. 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973).
21. 650 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1982).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) (cited in Samaritan, 791
P.2d at 347; Williams, 650 P.2d at 349 n.10; Luth, 507 P.2d at 764-65 n.14).
23. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 347.
24. Williams, 650 P.2d at 349 n.10; Luth, 507 P.2d at 764-65 n.14; cf Fruit, 502
P.2d at 140 (court does not explicitly incorporate the Restatement guidelines into its
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then went on, however, to discount the importance of the Restatement
by referring to its factors as mere "guidelines. '' 25
Fruit involved an insurance salesman who, while attending a
weekend convention required by his employer, injured a third party in
a car accident. 26 The accident occurred when the salesman was re-
turning to his hotel after an unsuccessful attempt to socialize with out-
of-town salesmen. 27 Arguing that Fruit was traveling to a private des-
tination, the employer requested a j.n.o.v. on the assumption that as a
matter of law Fruit's drive to the hotel had no business purpose, nor
was it under the employer's control. 28 In affirming the employer's vi-
carious liability, the supreme court rejected the "control theory,"
which limits an employer's liability to situations where the employer
authorized, acquiesced, or ratified the employee's behavior.29 Instead,
the court adopted an enterprise liability theory which utilized a "moti-
vation to serve" analysis. To support its decision that the employer
may be vicariously liable in this situation, the court noted that "[t]here
was evidence from which the jury could find that [Fruit] was at least'
motivated in part by his desire to meet with the out-of-state guests."'30
This "motivation to serve" analysis was reiterated in Luth. The
supreme court concluded that the standards established in section 228
of the Restatement were "indicative" of what conduct was within the
scope of employment.31 The Luth court determined that an employee
involved in a car accident could be acting within the scope of his em-
ployment when he was returning home from a work site located a con-
siderable distance from his home.32 Although Luth expressly
maintained that employer control and benefit were not prerequisites
for liability,3 3 the employee's motivation to serve played an integral
role in the opinion. 34 The Luth opinion emphasized from the outset
that the "scope of employment" rule should narrow an employer's lia-
bility.35 For example, the court explicitly noted how the "scope of
employment" standard for respondeat superior liability was more re-
strictive than the "arising out of and in the course of employment"
analysis, but it clearly considers "motivation to serve" as an integral part of enterprise
liability).
25. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 347.
26. Fruit, 502 P.2d at 135.
27. Id. at 136.
28. Id. at 139.
29. Id. at 140.
30. Id. at 142.
31. Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761, 764-65 n.14 (Alaska
1973).
32. Id. at 765.
33. Id. at 764.
34. Id. at 764-65.
35. Id. at 764.
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standard of workers' compensation. 36 By introducing the Restate-
ment's "scope of employment" standard and emphasizing the restric-
tive nature of this standard, the Luth court indicated that a
"motivation to serve" factor was an appropriate way to limit an em-
ployer's liability.
Williams also analyzed the issue of vicarious liability in terms of
the employee's motivation to serve. In this case a union steward called
a meeting to resolve the union members' personal grievances against
an employee who belonged to another union.37 The union members
assaulted the employee, who then sued the union on the basis of vicari-
ous liability for the steward's actions. The supreme court held that
"the trial court was clearly erroneous in concluding that [the union
steward] was acting outside the scope of his agency." 38 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied upon its finding that the union stew-
ard "was motivated, at least in part, to serve what he regarded as the
purposes of the union."'39 As in Fruit and Luth, the Alaska Supreme
Court considered the employee's motivation to serve an essential ele-
ment in assessing whether the employee was acting within the scope of
employment.
Thus, ever since the supreme court adopted an enterprise liability
theory for the doctrine of respondeat superior, its opinions have pro-
gressively expanded the boundaries of an employer's vicarious liability
to encompass social events, long rides home and job-related disputes.
Samaritan represents a further extension of these boundaries in order
to encompass sexual misconduct. Doe argued that the counseling
center should be held liable for Dr. Garvin's sexual misconduct. This
misconduct allegedly involved kissing and fondling that took place
during the plaintiff's final counseling sessions but which did not esca-
late into sexual intercourse until the relationship was pursued outside
the office after the counseling sessions had been terminated. 4° In de-
termining that the counseling center may be held vicariously liable for
such misconduct, the supreme court essentially rejected the "motiva-
tion to serve" restriction on the scope of employment used in Fruit,
Luth and Williams.
Although Samaritan conceded that Fruit seemed to require a mo-
tivation to serve the employer,41 the Samaritan court underestimated
the important role the Restatement's guidelines served in Luth and
Williams. In Samaritan, the court determined that neither Luth nor
36. Id. at 763.
37. Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 650 P.2d 343, 348 (Alaska 1982).
38. Id. at 351.
39. Id. at 350-51.
40. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 345.
41. Id. at 346.
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Williams considered such motivation a prerequisite for an employee's
conduct to fall within the scope of employment.42 The Samaritan ma-
jority stressed how Luth "expressly rejected" the Restatement's view
that each element of section 228(1) must be satisfied as a prerequisite
to recovery.43 Similarly, the Samaritan opinion stated that Luth
found control and motivation to be relevant, rather than determina-
tive, factors in deciding whether the employee's act was sufficiently
related to the employer's enterprise.44 To further diminish the impact
of the "motivation to serve" precedents, the Samaritan court noted
that Williams considered the elements of section 228 of the Restate-
ment to be merely "'guidelines which are useful in making ... the
determination as to when an employee's tort will be attributed to the
employer.' -45
The Samaritan decision did not accord due recognition to the fact
that in all of the supreme court's precedents concerning enterprise lia-
bility,46 the court considered the "motivation to serve" factor an inte-
gral aspect of its reasoning in favor of imposing vicarious liability
upon the employer. Even though none of these decisions explicitly
stated that such motivation was required for liability, its centrality in
establishing liability indicates that a departure from this standard is a
significant break with precedent.
The majority in Samaritan also examined the "motivation to
serve" requirement in cases that directly addressed the sexual miscon-
duct of employees. The supreme court noted that some courts that
view "motivation to serve" as a prerequisite for recovery in respondeat
superior have held that sexual misconduct is outside the scope of em-
ployment,47 while others employing the same "motivation to serve"
analysis "have concluded that employers may be held liable for the
sexual behavior of their therapist employees towards their patients."
48
However, the cases which the court cited in support of its position do
not employ the "motivation to serve" analysis in their reasoning. In
fact, the courts in Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States49 and Marston
42. Id. at 346-47.
43. Id. at 347.
44. Id.; see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text where Luth found that
control and benefit were not decisive factors; the court made no such assertion with
regard to motivation.
45. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 347 (quoting Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.,
650 P.2d 343, 349 (Alaska 1982)).
46. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
47. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 347.
48. Id.
49. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). The Samaritan decision itself recognized that
Ira S. Bushey discarded the "motivation to serve" test in favor of a foreseeability
approach. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 347-48.
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v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd.5 0 rejected this
analysis altogether. Similarly, in Simmons v. United States,51 the case
upon which the Alaska Supreme Court relied most heavily, the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning emphasized the employer's benefit rather than the
employee's motivation.5 2
These decisions therefore do not reconcile the "motivation to
serve" criterion with employer liability for sexual misconduct. In-
stead, they illustrate how a "motivation to serve" requirement is in-
compatible with imposing vicarious liability for sexual misconduct.
This incompatibility undermines the Alaska Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that "where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably inci-
dental to the employee's legitimate work activities, the 'motivation to
serve' test will have been satisfied."'5 3
The dissenting opinions in both Marston and Samaritan are more
compatible with Alaska's "motivation to serve" precedents. In Mar-
ston, the dissent argued that as a matter of law a therapist's sexual
misconduct5 4 did not fall within the scope of his employment because
this conduct could be distinguished from the kind of intentional torts
which did warrant imposing vicarious liability on an employer. Un-
like an assault resulting from an employment-related dispute, the ther-
apist's deliberate sexual misconduct did not originate within the scope
of his duties and thus did not have an employment-related" 'color and
quality.' ,,55 Essentially, the dissent reasoned that an employer should
not be held liable when the source of an employee's act originated not
in his duties as an employee but in his personal desires.5 6
Justice Moore in his Samaritan dissent similarly emphasized per-
sonal motivation. He argued that a therapist's sexual misconduct did
50. 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1983). The Minnesota Supreme Court in Marston
noted that it had "'abandoned'" the motivation test in an earlier decision. Id. at 310
(quoting Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 405, 211 N.W.2d 783, 786
(1978)).
51. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
52. Id. at 1369 (applying Washington agency law, in which the Washington
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the benefit to the employer in deter-
mining whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment).
53. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 348.
54. The sexual advances occurred during separate therapy sessions with two of
the psychologist's patients, whose cases were consolidated upon appeal. Marston, 329
N.W.2d at 308.
55. Id. at 313 (Peterson, J., dissenting) (quoting Lange v. National Biscuit Co.,
297 Minn. 399, 404, 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1973) (quoting Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.




not arise from the transference phenomenon, 57 but rather out of a per-
sonal desire to abuse the transference phenomenon intentionally.58
According to Justice Moore, the majority erred in relying on Sim-
mons' assessment of the transference phenomenon; the fact that trans-
ference is an essential element of psychotherapy does not mean that an
intentional abuse of transference to derive personal sexual gratification
is also essential to the therapy.5 9 Justice Moore argued that even
under the majority's revision of the "motivation to serve" standard, a
therapist's deliberate sexual misconduct would not "arise out of" and
be "reasonably incidental to" an employee's legitimate work activi-
ties. 6° A logical extension of Justice Moore's argument would be that
an unintended abuse of the transference phenomenon would come
within the scope of a therapist's employment, while a deliberate ex-
ploitation of the transference phenomenon solely for personal gratifi-
cation could not be said to arise from, or be reasonably incidental to,
the therapist's legitimate work activities.61 The "motivation to serve"
analysis abandoned by the Samaritan majority would recognize this
crucial distinction.
A general survey of case law illustrates that differing interpreta-
tions of the "motivation to serve" test make vicarious liability for a
therapist's sexual misconduct a very divisive issue. The Fourth Cir-
cuit 62 and Ninth Circuit 63 have split on this issue, and the state courts
are similarly divided. While the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
a clinic could be held vicariously liable,64 four other state supreme
57. In Simmons, a case factually similar to Samaritan, the transference phenome-
non was described as "the term used by psychiatrists and psychologists to denote a
patient's emotional reaction to a therapist and is 'generally applied to the projection of
feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some per-
son from the patient's past.' "Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1364 (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 1473 (5th Lawyers' Ed. 1982)).
58. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 352 (Moore, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In fact, such exploitation is commonly recognized as sabotaging the very pur-
pose of the therapist's work. See supra note 14.
62. Doe v. United States, 769 F.2d 174, 175 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding summary
judgment for the government because an Air Force social worker "clearly was acting
for his personal gratification rather than within the scope of his employment" when he
convinced the plaintiff that engaging in deviant sexual conduct was part of her
treatment).
63. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306 (I i.nn. 1983).
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courts in the last three years - Colorado,65 Utah,66 Hawaii 67 and Ala-
bama68 - determined that vicarious liability was not appropriate in
cases involving an employee's sexual misconduct. In New Jersey 69
and New York,70 state appellate courts have also refused to extend
vicarious liability to therapist-patient relationships.
Although the emasculation of the "motivation to serve" test was
the Samaritan court's most crucial departure from the Restatement's
guidelines, the court's analysis of other section 228 factors deserves
attention as well. A second factor considered by the court in Samari-
tan was whether the employee's conduct was "different in kind" from
that authorized by the employer.71 The majority argued that the ther-
apist's conduct was not different in kind because it arose out of and
was reasonably incidental to the counseling activities authorized by
and beneficial to the counseling center.72 Justice Moore disagreed
65. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (upholding summary judg-
ment for archdiocese because, as a matter of law, the archdiocese could not be held
vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of a priest who had been consulted in his
professional capacity as a marriage counselor).
66. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). Using the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency for general guidance, the court determined that the em-
ployee's sexual misconduct was not motivated, even in part, by the purpose of serving
the employer's interest. Id. at 1059. The court upheld a j.n.o.v. in which the county
was not held liable under respondeat superior for a licensed social worker's sexual
misconduct with his patient. Id.
67. Sharples v. State, 71 Haw. 404, 793 P.2d 175 (1990) (upholding summary
judgment because the psychiatrist's sexual relations with his patient, which took place
during their professional relationship, was, as a matter of law, not within the scope of
his employment).
68. Doe v. Swift, 570 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1990). The court determined that even if
the abuse of the transference phenomenon was not "purely personal" but instead con-
stituted negligent counseling, Simmons was irrelevant to the present case because
there was no time for the transference to develop. Id. at 1213. In addition, the court
noted that there were "numerous other cases holding that sexual misconduct by an
employee is purely personal and outside the line and scope of his employment." Id. at
1211 (footnote omitted).
69. Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 214 N.J. Super. 670, 520 A.2d 844 (Law Div. 1986),
aff'd, 215 N.J. Super. 561, 522 A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1987) (upholding a summary
judgment ruling that a mental health clinic was not subject to respondeat superior
liability even though the defendant social worker therapist characterized his sexual
misconduct as being in pursuit of his employer's ends).
70. Noto v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Medical Center, 142 Misc. 2d 292, 537
N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 160 A.D.2d 656, 559 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990) (upholding summary judgment in favor of hospital in suit regarding vicari-
ous liability for a psychiatrist's sexual misconduct with a former patient). The
supreme court, appellate division, noted "[tihat a hospital is not responsible under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for sexual relations between professional employees
and patients accords with the prevailing weight of authority in other jurisdictions."
160 A.D.2d at 656-57, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 511.




with the majority's analysis, relying on his basic premise that if the
authorized conduct was the psychotherapy itself, then the majority's
argument was inaccurate because their approach assumed that the sex-
ual misconduct arose from the transference itself rather than the abuse
of transference. 73 Justice Moore concluded that no logical interpreta-
tion could hold that sexual misconduct was reasonably incidental to
the therapist's authorized duties as a psychotherapist. 74
The final factor of section 228's scope of employment test ad-
dressed by the court in Samaritan was that the employee's conduct
could not be: "'far beyond ... authorized time or space limits.' ",7s
Justice Moore criticized the majority for incorrectly assuming that any
tortious conduct within authorized time or space limits would suffice.
Instead, section 228(l)(b) stated that such activity must occur "sub-
stantially" within these limits. 76 Because all but two minor incidents
of sexual misconduct occurred outside the office and after the termina-
tion of therapy, Justice Moore reasoned that "[n]o reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that the tortious conduct occurred substantially
during therapy." 77
IV. SAMIARITAN'S "REASONABLY INCIDENT" TEST FAILS TO
RECOGNIZE LIMITS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY THEORY
The most fundamental division between the majority and the dis-
sent in Samaritan, however, concerns their basic assumptions regard-
ing the enterprise liability theory. The majority viewed this theory in
a purely functional manner as a means of achieving cost distribution.
The dissent focused on the internal coherence of this tort theory,
stressing that its legitimacy depended on whether the costs at issue
were truly caused by and not merely incidental to the enterprise. In
addition, Justice Moore argued that for this theory to function prop-
erly, the court should not simply assume that such liability would au-
tomatically result in appropriate cost distribution. This discrepancy
between the majority's and dissent's basic assumptions is manifested
by the majority's broad interpretation of the "scope of employment"
criteria contained in section 228 and the dissent's correspondingly nar-
row interpretation. In rejecting a more restrictive interpretation of the
scope of employment, the majority recognized the full implications of
its choice: "we are of the view that the 'motivation to serve' test, so
73. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
74. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 352 (Moore, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 349 (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1958)).




construed, would too significantly undercut the enterprise liability ba-
sis of the respondeat superior doctrine."78 The majority then cited
Fruit as establishing the rationale for this doctrine, namely "'the de-
sire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third per-
sons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the
burden among those benefited by the enterprise.' -79 Yet from Justice
Moore's perspective, the majority's application of the Restatement cri-
teria was "erroneous... when viewed in light of the purposes of re-
spondeat superior liability."80 Examining the underlying purposes of
enterprise liability as articulated in Fruit will demonstrate that such
purposes cannot be achieved through indiscriminate application of en-
terprise liability to all employment situations.
A. The Origins of Fruit's Enterprise Liability Theory
When adopting enterprise liability as the policy basis for its re-
spondeat superior doctrine in Fruit, the Alaska Supreme Court based
its decision on the rationale articulated by Professor Young B. Smith
in Frolic and Detour. 81 The court reiterated this rationale in Luth, 8 2
Williams8 3 and Samaritan.8 4 The Fruit decision favored Professor
Smith's analysis of enterprise liability because he "correctly stated"
the basis of respondeat superior liability.8 5 When Smith's analysis is
read as a whole, it is clear that the Samaritan majority was misguided
in assuming that a traditional "motivation to serve" requirement
would significantly undercut the enterprise liability basis of Alaska's
respondeat superior doctrine. In the portion of Frolic and Detour re-
peatedly cited in the court's opinions, Professor Smith argued that en-
terprise liability was justified because it internalized and redistributed
the inevitable costs incident to operating an enterprise. The remainder
of the passage, however, contained an important qualification which
recognized the danger of applying enterprise liability indiscriminately.
The passage in its entirety, with the portion cited by the supreme court
appearing in italics, reads as follows:
78. Id. at 349.
79. Id. (quoting Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (quoting
Smith, supra note 19, at 718)).
80. Id. at 353 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
81. Fruit, 502 P.2d at 141 (quoting Smith, supra note 19, at 718).
82. Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d at 763 (noting that Fruit
"adopted a modified 'enterprise theory' of respondeat superior").
83. Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 650 P.2d at 349 (quoting Smith, supra
note 19, at 718).
84. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d at 349 (quoting Smith, supra
note 19, at 718).
85. Fruit, 502 P.2d at 141.
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If, as suggested in the first part of this article, the justification for
making the master liable for his servant's unauthorized torts is the
desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third
persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the
burden among those benefited by the enterprise, it would seem desir-
able to impose liability upon the master in every case where the loss
may fairly be regarded as an incident to carrying on the particular
enterprise, provided the imposition of liability would not interfere
with the conduct of the enterprise to such an extent as to create
inconveniences which would outweigh the inconveniences of casting
severe losses upon a few persons.86
The significance of the entire passage is its recognition that even
when a loss could be regarded as incidental to an enterprise's opera-
tion, this fact should not automatically impose liability upon the enter-
prise. Professor Smith indicated that enterprise liability would be
inappropriate if it interfered with the conduct of the enterprise to such
an extent that the social costs to beneficiaries of the enterprise far out-
weighed the benefits to victims of enterprise related activity.
In the context of Samaritan, imposing liability on a mental health
clinic for a therapist's sexual misconduct may significantly limit its
ability to provide affordable counseling for those least able to pay.
Based on Smith's result-oriented analysis, the debate over the transfer-
ence phenomenon could well be moot. When the social costs of im-
posing enterprise liability outweigh any resulting benefits, it does not
matter whether the transference phenomenon made the sexual miscon-
duct incidental to the therapy.
Professor Smith's analysis of enterprise liability also provides al-
ternative grounds for rejecting or limiting vicarious liability for an em-
ployee's sexual misconduct. Even though Smith advocated an
expansive approach to respondeat superior liability, he nonetheless re-
alized that an employer should not be held liable for all possible acts of
his employees.8 7 Instead, the court should consider the threshold issue
of "whether the conduct of the master's business was a contributing
cause of the servant's act .... If not, the master is not liable."' 8 Only
if this threshold is met should the court examine whether the miscon-
duct was probable enough to justify liability.89 When the misconduct
resembles authorized conduct, the determining factor would be
whether the employee's "objective is some goal he was employed to
attain." 90 To explain this distinction, Professor Smith used the follow-
ing illustration:
86. Smith, supra note 19 at 718 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Fruit, 502
P.2d at 141.
87. Smith, supra note 19, at 724.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id at 721.
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If it be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur's sole
motive in driving was to reach an unauthorized objective .... there
would be no more justification for holding the master liable than if
the chauffeur had started in the opposite direction .... The mere
coincidence that he was traveling the identical path he would have
traveled had he been headed for the authorized objective... should
not change the result.91
This illustration suggests that a clinic should not be vicariously liable
for a therapist's sexual misconduct simply because the transference
phenomenon the therapist manipulates is a common factor in both a
responsible and irresponsible relationship with a patient. The real is-
sue is whether his sole motive in manipulating this phenomenon is for
his personal gratification. The very nature of a therapist's deliberate
sexual misconduct indicates that his motive is purely personal because
such behavior completely undermines his authorized role as a
counselor.92
By relying on the Frolic and Detour passage from Fruit to cor-
rectly state the rationale for respondeat superior liability,93 the Samar-
itan majority implicitly endorsed Professor Smith's conceptualization
of enterprise liability. However, a reading of the article as a whole
reveals that Smith's conceptualization involves limitations on the
scope of enterprise liability. Professor Smith's approach recognizes
the need for a balancing test to weigh the social costs and benefits
resulting from the imposition of enterprise liability. In addition, this
approach notes that tortious conduct arising from purely personal mo-
tives should not subject an employer to vicarious liability, even if the
employee's misconduct closely resembled authorized conduct. Both of
these qualifications illustrate how limitations on the scope of enter-
prise liability are compatible with the origins of Alaska's enterprise
liability doctrine. This compatibility indicates that the supreme court
in Samaritan was departing from, rather than reinforcing, precedent
when the court assumed that a motivation to serve requirement would
"too significantly undercut the enterprise liability basis of the respon-
deat superior doctrine ... previously articulated. '94
91. Id. at 725.
92. The facts in Samaritan support this observation. The patient's affidavit indi-
cated that both she and the therapist recognized the harmful aspects of such conduct:
"I confronted him about his conduct and he agreed he was wrong." Samaritan, 791
P.2d at 345; see also supra note 14.




B. Two Standards for Vicarious Liability: The Commercial/Non-
Commercial Dichotomy
Recent commentaries on enterprise liability also demonstrate that
restricting the scope of enterprise liability is consistent with the ration-
ale of internalizing and redistributing the costs associated with operat-
ing an enterprise. One such restriction arises when the enterprise in
question is not a commercial operation. Because profit-generating en-
tities can internalize and redistribute their costs, expanding their vica-
rious liability is consistent with the rationale of enterprise liability.
The same is not true for non-commercial entities, which cannot read-
ily absorb and pass on the costs of vicarious liability; such liability
produces serious side effects when imposed on entities that are not
aimed at generating profits. This dichotomy suggests that restrictions
on enterprise liability are appropriate for non-commercial enterprises.
1. Restrictions on Enterprise Liability for Non-Commercial Enter-
prises. Current evaluations of vicarious liability stress that indiscrim-
inately imposing vicarious liability on all employers is inappropriate.
For instance, Professor William Baxter advocates distinguishing be-
tween private and public enterprises when determining whether enter-
prise liability should apply.95 Professor Baxter concludes that the
deterrence rationale for enterprise liability, which assumes that busi-
nesses are better able than victims to reduce the harms associated with
their operation, does not apply to public entities.96 By linking a busi-
ness' profit to its ability to reduce the magnitude of the harm associ-
ated with its operation, enterprise liability can force a business to
achieve a socially optimal reduction in output. To the extent that
modifications in input and internal processes could not entirely reduce
the harm, the price of the outputs would rise and sales would fall. All
of this requires a fairly elastic demand curve, something which does
not exist for public operations. Instead, in a public setting, output
price is either nothing or bears no specific relationship to cost; profit
incentives for cost-minimizing are also very weak. Under these cir-
cumstances, enterprise liability cannot function properly. 97
Professor Lewis Kornhauser also argues in favor of restricting en-
terprise liability. 98 Although enterprise liability produces greater
levels of care in the private sector, Professor Kornhauser concludes
that the level of care issue is irrelevant in the public sector: "[t]he key
95. Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Private, 42 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS.
45 (Winter 1978).
96. Id. at 51.
97. Id.
98. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Per-
sonal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345 (1982).
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question with respect to public enterprise is whether [to] impose liabil-
ity on the public enterprise or public servant at all." 99 Both Professor
Kornhauser's and Professor Baxter's arguments indicate that a funda-
mental premise of enterprise liability is that the success of an enter-
prise depends upon its ability to generate profits. Certain enterprises,
like those in the public sector, focus on providing a beneficial public
service rather than on maximizing profit. These service-oriented enti-
ties violate a fundamental premise of enterprise liability, thus demon-
strating inherent limitations in how effective this form of respondeat
superior liability can be.
2. More Expansive Enterprise Liability for Commercial Enter-
prises. Inherent limitations on enterprise liability are even acknowl-
edged in a policy evaluation that advocates vicarious liability for
personally motivated torts. According to Alan Sykes,10° if an em-
ployee's sexual harassment "is 'caused' by the employer's enterprise,
this fact weighs in favor of strict vicarious liability. Liability based on
negligence is more efficient if the causal relation between the enterprise
and the harassment is weak but the employer can nonetheless adopt
inexpensive, effective incentive devices to dissuade employees from
misconduct."101
Sykes' expr.nsive view of enterprise liability is qualified by its reli-
ance on the commercial attributes of enterprises. For instance, his ba-
sic rationale for an employer's vicarious liability is that "the efficiency
of resource allocation is enhanced if each business enterprise bears the
incremental social costs associated with its operation."10 2 Signifi-
cantly, Sykes describes the entity subject to vicarious liability as a
"business enterprise" rather than an employer. This description con-
forms with Sykes' initial observation that the best risk bearers are
those that can diversify the risk and obtain liability insurance more
readily.103 The implicit assumption is that an enterprise can finance
such insurance by increasing the price of its products. Such an as-
sumption demonstrates the limits of Sykes' argument in favor of ex-
tending the boundaries of vicarious liability to encompass personally
motivated misconduct. Few non-commercial employers can pass
along increased costs by increasing the price of their product, nor is
insurance a viable option in all liability situations. In addition, Sykes
does not factor in the social costs associated with the curtailment or
99. Id. at 1380.
100. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563
(1988).
101. Id. at 606.
102. Id. at 573.
103. Id. at 568 n.14.
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elimination of such enterprises when they cannot raise prices to buy
insurance. Even though Sykes advocates the expansion of vicarious
liability, his analysis demonstrates the same fundamental limitation of
enterprise liability recognized by Professor Baxter and Professor
Kornhauser: unrestricted enterprise liability is effective only for com-
mercial entities.
V. PROPER APPLICATION OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY THEORY
TO NON-COMMERCIAL ENTITIES IN SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT CASES
When faced with a teacher's sexual misconduct in John R. v.
Oakland Unified School District,104 the California Supreme Court
chose to implement fundamental limitations on enterprise liability.
The California court determined that the objectives of enterprise liabil-
ity cannot be achieved in the public sector, specifically in regards to
public schools. John R. held that a school district could not, as a mat-
ter of law, be held vicariously liable for a high school teacher's sexual
misconduct which took place during authorized extracurricular activi-
ties. 105 The California Supreme Court found that none of the "under-
lying justifications for the respondeat superior doctrine would be
served by imposing vicarious liability" for a teacher's sexual miscon-
duct with one of his students. 0 6 Justice Moore came to a similar con-
clusion in Samaritan regarding the clinic's liability for its therapist's
misconduct: "[tlhe same considerations [recognized by John R.] apply
with even more force in the case of mental health employers."'10 7
Even though the majority opinion in Samaritan dismissed the
reasoning of John R.,1081 Justice Moore's dissent relied heavily on its
reasoning to analyze the policy objectives for imposing vicarious liabil-
ity on employers: accident prevention, compensation and cost spread-
ing.109 These policy objectives are common to an employer's vicarious
liability under both the Alaska and California common law.
104. 48 Cal. 3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989).
105. Id. at 44.1, 769 P.2d at 949, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
106. Id. at 452, 769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
107. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 353 (Moore, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 34.8 n.8.
109. Id. at 353-54 (Moore, J., dissenting). Significantly, California cases cited in
John R. relied on the same general tort treatises which have guided Alaska precedents.
See John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 450-51, 769 P.2d at 955-56, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74 (citing
5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.5, at 21 (2d ed. 1986);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 471 (3d ed. 1964)); see also Fruit, 502 P.2d at 139.
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In terms of accident prevention, because clinics and schools are
held directly liable for their negligence in hiring and supervising em-
ployees, vicarious liability deters no more sexual misconduct than lia-
bility based on negligence. 110 The only impact vicarious liability has
in this regard is negative. Schools would be forced to curtail extracur-
ricular activities where close supervision was not possible, and clinics
would be encouraged "to invade the privacy of the therapist-patient
relationship."111
The compensation objective of vicarious liability is also hard to
accomplish in cases involving an employee's sexual misconduct. Both
the John R. majority and the Samaritan dissent found that liability
insurance is a scarce, expensive commodity which would become even
harder to obtain if employers became liable for their employees' sexual
misconduct. Even assuming that such insurance could be obtained,
the costs in terms of funds diverted from classrooms and medical
treatment may be too great a price for society to pay. 112
Cost spreading among beneficiaries of the enterprise is another
objective that, according to the California decision and Justice
Moore's dissent, would not be accomplished by making employers vi-
cariously liable for sexual misconduct. 1 3 Because personally moti-
vated sexual misconduct is outside the scope of employment, the costs
of such misconduct should not be passed on to the employer and the
ultimate consumers.11 4 Justice Moore and the California majority
maintain that psychiatric patients and school students as a whole
should not have to bear the costs of misconduct having no connection
to a therapist's or teacher's attempt to fulfill authorized duties.115
An Alaska Superior Court ruling subsequent to the Samaritan
decision also demonstrates the limits of enterprise liability in a non-
commercial setting. In Ciarochi v. The Boy Scouts of America,1 1 6
Judge Jahnke granted a summary judgment motion denying a claim of
vicarious liability for an agent's sexual misconduct.11 7 Ciarochi in-
volved a scoutmaster's sexual misconduct with a ten year-old scout
who attended scouting activities supervised by the scoutmaster.118
110. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 353 (Moore, J., dissenting); John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 451,
769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
111. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 353 (Moore, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 353-54 (Moore, J., dissenting); John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 451, 769 P.2d at
956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
113. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 354 (Moore, J., dissenting); John R., 48 Cal. 3d at
451-52, 769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
114. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
115. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 354; John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 451-52, 769 P.2d at 956,
256 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
116. No. 1KE-89-42 CI, slip op. (Alaska Super. Ct. August 6, 1990).
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id. at 1-2.
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Although Judge Jahnke factually distinguished the Samaritan deci-
sion, 119 the court endorsed the John R. decision because the California
Supreme Court had rejected a "formulaic analysis" in favor of "an
examination of the fundamental policies underlying vicarious liabil-
ity."12o The Ciarochi opinion itself provides an in-depth policy analy-
sis of enterprise liability, which Judge Jahnke described as "an inquiry
somewhat broader in scope and detail than the inquiry in John R.'121
The court formulated its liability rule in light of considerations
identified by commentators such as Sykes and Professor Korn-
hauser. 122 Like the Moore dissent in Samaritan, the Ciarochi opinion
found that vicarious liability would not deter sexual misconduct to any
greaier extent than liability based on negligence:
strict vicarious liability is probably ineffective to foster any greater
care post-hire than liability based on negligence since the compli-
ance of the agent is extremely hard to monitor; beyond the care the
enterprise might take in hiring the agent, there is little more the
enterprise can do to monitor the agent's performance in the social
service context absent fundamental changes in the nature of the
enterprise. 123
These comments concerned sexually inappropriate conduct toward
children, but they apply equally well to inappropriate conduct toward
adult patients. In doctor-patient and authority-child relationships, re-
lying on the deterrent effect of inspection procedures, risk sharing and
personnel actions is not feasible because sexual misconduct is invaria-
bly surreptitious and rarely foreseen. 124 In essence, "[c]onventional
incentives and disincentives used by enterprises simply do not work to
deter compulsive sexual misconduct."' 125
The Ciarochi opinion also emphasized the dichotomy between
commercial enterprises and social service enterprises in determining
whether enterprise liability was appropriate. Citing Sykes' article, the
court recognized that "[i]n a profit-seeking enterprise, it may be so-
cially optimal to impose the cost of liability judgments for agents' torts
119. Id. at 12 (distinguishing Samaritan because the transference phenomenon
made sexual misconduct "foreseeable"). But see Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 353 (Moore,
J., dissenting). Justice Moore argued that the sexual misconduct in Samaritan is
analogous to that involved in John R. even though the teacher-student relationship in
John R. does not involve the transference phenomenon. According to expert testi-
mony presented during the Samaritan trial, Justice Moore noted that "the counselor/
counselee relationship could be described psychologically as similar to a parent au-
thority figure and a child dependent relationship." Id. at 353 n.4.
120. Ciarochi, No. IKE-89-42 CI, slip op. at 19-20.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id.





on the enterprise to prevent excess profits or excess production."1 26
Yet in the non-commercial setting, the Ciarochi court recognized, as
Justice Moore and the John R. majority had previously determined, 127
that such liability would only reduce beneficial social services. 128
When addressing the issue of victim compensation, the Ciarochi
court admitted that even in the context of sexual misconduct, vicari-
ous liability still achieved its goals of compensation and risk spread-
ing.129 However, the cost of achieving these goals was too high when
"the victim can be compensated by the social service enterprise only at
a cost of the reduction or elimination of services to... [other] social
service recipients." 130 This argument was especially powerful in the
context of the Ciarochi case, which involved a charitable social service
enterprise largely run by volunteers.131 Such an argument also applies
to mental health providers like the Samaritan Counseling Center,
whose increased liability would result in denying services to those who
could least afford to pay for psychological counseling.' 32
VI. CONCLUSION
The Samaritan majority assumed that the Restatement's "moti-
vation to serve" test would undermine the enterprise liability theory
for an employer's vicarious liability.' 33 When this assumption is mea-
sured against Alaska precedent, theoretical assessments of enterprise
liability, and other states' approaches, the supreme court appears to
have assumed too much. The precedents established in Fruit, Luth
and Williams all utilized a "motivation to serve" standard which cor-
responded to the Restatement's definition of the scope of employ-
ment. 134 The Samaritan majority also failed to consider the inherent
limitations of enterprise liability theory. Non-commercial enterprises
cannot distribute burdens among those benefited by the enterprise
without exacting an unacceptably high social cost. Both theoretical
commentaries 3 5 and judicial opinions' 36 illustrate how limitations on
an employer's vicarious liability in the non-commercial context are
126. Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
127. See supra notes 104-115 and accompanying text.
128. Ciarochi, No. 1KE-89-42 CI, slip op. at 23.
129. Id. at 25.
130. Id. at 26.
131. Id.
132. See Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 354 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also John R., 48
Cal. 3d at 451, 769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (arguing that the availability of
education services would be similarly vulnerable).
133. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 349.
134. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 104-132 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the fundamental premises of the enterprise liability
theory. In general, these authorities indicate that a "motivation to
serve" requirement would not undermine enterprise liability to the ex-
tent assumed by the Alaska Supreme Court.
Even in Alaska there is no clear consensus on this issue, as indi-
cated by the Legislative Affairs Committee's latest recommenda-
tions. 137 This committee suggested that the Seventeenth State
Legislature review Samaritan to determine whether the legislature
should enact legislation to alter the common law determined by the
court. At some point the need to hold enterprises liable for the total
costs of their operation has to be reconciled with support for enter-
prises considered socially beneficial regardless of market considera-
tions. The legislature may be in the best position to determine which
enterprises - such as schools, day care centers, hospitals, churches -
deserve to be exempt from an expansive enterprise liability rule origi-
nally designed for commercial enterprises.
All these factors suggest the Samaritan holding should, at most,
only carve out a special exception to the "motivation to serve" require-
ment, based on the recognition that the transference phenomenon
makes the resulting sexual misconduct uniquely "incidental" to ther-
apy. This approach was adopted by Ciarochi, 1 38 but even such a lim-
ited exception violates the rationale for an employer's vicarious
liability. "Scope of employment" has no meaning if the employer is
held liable when the employee acts for purely personal motives; the
employer then becomes liable for acts which have no link to the em-
ployee's legitimate duties. Vicarious liability for a therapist's sexual
misconduct illustrates how paradoxical enterprise liability becomes in
such situations.
Cliona Mary Robb
137. LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH LEGIS-
LATURE 1 (Nov. 1990).
138. No. 1KE-89-42 CI, slip op. at 12 (Alaska Super. Ct. August 6, 1990).
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